The Internal Political Struggles of Russia and Its Engagements with Georgia: the Abkhazian Conflict and Related Events (1992-1993)

Abstract

The objective of this research is to explore the political developments in Russia during 1992-1993 and assess whether the domestic political crisis at that time influenced the war in Abkhazia. The article also examines the key turning points of the conflict in Abkhazia and delves into the details of Russia's involvement in the war. According to renowned American scholar Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Humanity has not only reached the end of a distinct post-war historical period, but also an ideological and evolutionary culmination, wherein liberal democracy is envisioned as the ultimate form of human government. This was shared by the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who believed that the United States was a natural ally of democratic Russia and an enemy of the totalitarian Soviet empire. He characterized the Soviet Union as "wrongly" and "illegally" developed. Needless to say, all this contributed to the revival of the myth of two Russia both in the Western world and in Georgia. Unfortunately, the political elites did not realize that the existence of two Russia was an illusion, which was clearly confirmed by the processes that developed in Abkhazia in 1992-1993. The visions of Eduard Shevardnadze, who placed the responsibility for the situation created by Russia not on Boris Yeltsin and the democrats in the presidential apparatus, but on the head of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov and the military, turned out to be completely wrong. Although Khasbulatov himself openly opposed Yeltsin on issues of power distribution and economic reforms, their strategy regarding the ongoing events in Abkhazia was openly anti-Georgian. This article reviews the internal political conflict in the Russian Federation in 1992-1993 and provides an analysis of the crucial turning points in the Abkhazian war within this context. In general, President Boris Yeltsin's administration during this period was primarily focused on modernizing the Russian economy and liberalizing its foreign policy (integration into Western political structures). Understandably, the conservative and militaristic political factions expressed dissatisfaction with these developments. However, when considering the facts and outcomes, it becomes clear that the ongoing discontent and controversies had no effect on the final results of the conflict in Abkhazia. The course of events indicated that the prevailing imperial mindset remained steadfast throughout. Even Andrei Kozyrev, the most liberal and influential foreign minister at the time, shared the imperial ideology, advocating for the post-Soviet states to remain within Russia's economic and political sphere of influence. This viewpoint was clearly illustrated by Russia's involvement in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's government during the Georgian Civil War and its active support for separatists in the Abkhazian conflict. From a methodological perspective, this work falls within the realm of qualitative research. The content analysis method was used to review primary sources such as press articles and memoirs, and the discourse analysis method was applied to analyze secondary sources consisting of academic literature related to the research topic. In addition, the process tracing method was employed to elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships of historical events. During 1992-1993, Russian intervention was a pivotal factor in the conflict in Georgia, significantly influencing the hostilities and ultimately tipping the balance in favor of the Abkhaz separatists. For both President Yeltsin and Chairman Khasbulatov, securing international recognition of Russia as the guarantor of peace and stability in the former Soviet Union was crucial. This objective aligned with the broader imperial strategy aimed at maintaining the Caucasus within Russia’s sphere of influence. The strategy of fragmented imperialism, developed before the Soviet Union's collapse, significantly shaped the Russian Federation's objectives in the ongoing conflict in Georgia. This approach exploited that the separatist aspirations of the autonomies within the pro-independence union republics were to be used against the republic themselves. Despite public disagreements between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin on power-sharing and economic reform, their approach to the situation in Abkhazia was distinctly anti-Georgian, reflecting a unified stance on this aspect of foreign policy. The analysis of these actions underscores the continuity of Russia's imperial mindset, with the ultimate objective not to acknowledge Georgia as an independent and sovereign state. In this context, the war in Abkhazia was utilized effectively as a means to punish and weaken Georgia. The consistency of this approach suggests that irrespective of which political faction controlled Russia during 1991-1993, the outcome would have likely remained the same.